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Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE and FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 







 Leonard Patrick appeals from the judgement of the District Court.  We will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 In March 2016, Patrick filed an amended complaint in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Werner Enterprises (“Werner”), 
asserting claims for same-sex harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  Patrick alleges that while he was 
employed as a truck driver with Werner, he was sexually harassed on the basis of his 
gender by his driving trainer, David Tompkins.  Specifically, Patrick claims that 
Tompkins told him on one occasion that his lisp made him sound gay, showed him nude 
photos of women on his phone, and sexually assaulted him.  Regarding the sexual assault, 
Patrick contends that on June 1, 2013, while he and Tompkins were nearing the end of 
their route, Tompkins insisted on making a stop to wash his clothes.  While Tompkins 
laundered his clothing at a truck stop, Patrick went to the sleeping quarters in the vehicle 
and attempted to sleep.  Shortly thereafter, Tompkins entered the truck, woke up Patrick, 
and asked him to move from the lower bunk to the upper bunk.  Patrick claims that he 
refused to move, and Tompkins then removed his clothing and climbed into the bunk 
where Patrick was lying and rubbed his body against him.  Patrick pushed Tompkins 
away and immediately contacted a Werner dispatcher to report the incident.  Patrick 
claims that he told the dispatcher that he would not return to the truck and ride with 
Tompkins.  He took a cab to a nearby train station and traveled home. 
 Subsequently, Patrick spoke with a safety specialist from Werner and prepared a 
statement about the incident, followed by a conference call with several of Werner’s 
supervisory and human resources personnel.  Patrick claims that after he reported  
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Tompkins’ conduct, he received lower paying, less desirable jobs, and was removed from 
a driving assignment purportedly due to a reduction in force.  Patrick alleges that he was 
then terminated and told to return his truck and keys.   
 Werner filed an answer to Patrick’s amended complaint, and the parties engaged 
in discovery.  In July 2017, Patrick filed a “Memorandum,” which consisted primarily of 
a list of exhibits along with the accompanying documents.  Because there was no motion 
pending, the District Court ordered the documents stricken from the record, but noted that 
Patrick could file another memorandum and exhibits at the appropriate time – either in 
opposition to a motion filed by Werner or in support of his own motion.  The District 
Court denied Patrick’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. 
 In August 2017, Werner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was 
not a proper defendant because it was not Patrick’s employer, and that Patrick had failed 
to set forth prima facie claims of sexual harassment and retaliation.  The Magistrate 
Judge ordered Patrick to file, on or before September 5, 2017, a brief in opposition to 
Werner’s motion,1 which Patrick failed to do.  In December 2017, the Magistrate Judge 
recommended that the motion be granted as the undisputed facts showed that Werner was 
not Patrick’s employer and that Patrick was not subjected to sexual harassment or 
retaliation after he complained of Tompkins’ conduct.  Patrick did not file any objections 
                                              
1 The Magistrate Judge noted that unlike his previous “Memorandum,” Patrick’s brief 
should “respond to the arguments raised in [Werner’s] brief in support . . . [and] cite to 
record evidence supporting any denial of [Werner’s] statements of material fact.”  See 
Dist. Ct. Dkt. 98 at 2.  The Magistrate Judge warned that if Patrick failed to deny a 
material fact set forth in Werner’s statement of material facts or failed to cite to record 
evidence to support a denial of a material fact, the fact would be deemed admitted.   
 4 
 
to the Magistrate Judge’s report and, on February 16, 2018, the District Court adopted the 
Magistrate Judge’s recommendations.  Patrick appeals.   
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision granting summary judgment.  See 
McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 363 (3d Cir. 2005).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
 To establish a prima facie Title VII claim, a plaintiff “must allege an employment 
relationship with the defendant[].”  Covington v. Int’l Ass’n of Approve Basketball 
Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2013).   A parent corporation will be held 
responsible as an employer under Title VII only where it and the subsidiary are “so 
interrelated and integrated in their activities, labor relations and management” that we 
should pierce the corporate veil.  Marzano v. Computer Sci. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 514 (3d 
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).  The relationship between the parent and the subsidiary 
must be one where the subsidiary is the “mere instrumentality of the parent corporation.”  
Id. at 513.  Here, the undisputed record shows that Patrick was hired on April 3, 2013, by 
Drivers Management, LLC (“DM”).  While DM is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gra-
Gar, LLC, which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Werner, DM alone paid Patrick’s 
wages and provided his paychecks.  Patrick does not dispute that Werner is not a proper 
defendant, nor does he claim that Werner and DM shared common management, 
ownership, or financial management.  Because Patrick failed to set forth facts showing 
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that there is a genuine issue for trial regarding Werner’s status as his employer, the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Werner. 
 In his appellate brief, Patrick essentially makes two arguments in support of his 
appeal, but neither one has any bearing on the dispositive question whether Werner was 
his employer.  First, he claims that he was not provided certain discovery regarding the 
existence of a “Student Driver Manager (“SDM”)/Dispatch Operator,” to whom he 
complained about the alleged incident.  This claim is meritless as Werner has identified 
only one SDM/Dispatch Operator involved in the incident, Cory Morris, whose name 
Werner provided to Patrick.  Moreover, by Order dated July 7, 2017, the District Court 
found the Werner had produced all relevant discovery for the case.  Second, Patrick 
claims that he was precluded by the District Court from producing a response to Werner’s 
summary judgment motion.  This claim is equally unpersuasive as the Magistrate Judge, 
mindful of Patrick’s pro se status, explicitly instructed him as to when to respond to 
Werner’s motion, the manner in which he was required to respond, and the consequences 
for failing to do so.  Despite this clear instruction, Patrick failed to respond to Werner’s 
summary judgment motion or later object to the Magistrate Judge’s report and 
recommendation.    
 Patrick does not appear to address the merits of his sexual harassment and 
retaliation claims in his appellate brief, but states simply that Werner’s “witness gave 
false statement.”2  Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court that even if Werner 
                                              
2 In his reply brief, Patrick asserts only that “there was an issue between Trainer and 
Plaintiff.”  He also claims for the first time that “he was given unfair loads and miles.”  
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were a proper defendant, Patrick has failed to state prima facie claims of sexual 
harassment and retaliation.3   
  For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
We need address only arguments that Patrick raised in his opening brief.  See United 
States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 555 n.13 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 
3Although it is unclear, Patrick also appeared to claim that he was subject to a hostile 
work environment based on sexual harassment.  The District Court did not address this 
claim, but it must fail because he cannot establish that he was discriminated against 
because of his sex.  See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 167 (3d Cir. 
2013).  Nor has he demonstrated that the three minor discrete incidents that he was 
exposed to were severe or pervasive.  See Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1484 
(3d Cir. 1990) (holding that “harassment is pervasive when ‘incidents of harassment 
occur either in concert or with regularity’”) (citation omitted); see also Faragher v. City 
of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and 
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in 
the terms and conditions of employment.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  
